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Abstract 
 
The need to improve British Sport in terms of success, efficiency and organisation can be 
traced back to the British failures at the Stockholm Games in 1912. Despite gradually 
diminishing international performances British policy makers did little to try to resolve 
the problem and the poor performances continued, something which the British public 
had now become accustomed to. However, the poor result at the 1952 Helsinki Games 
may have acted as a catalyst to improve the success of the British teams on the 
international stage because in 1960 The Wolfenden Report suggested that improvement 
was potentially linked to a relaxation in amateur rules and the introduction of scientific 
methods of training. Perhaps this provided the impetus needed because in 1965 the 
British Olympic Association expressed a desire to improve performance from means 
other than those of standard training. This marked a pivotal moment in British sport as it 
heralded a move away from the traditional amateur ethos which has gradually become 
marginalised as the guiding principle in British sport. This paper traces the development 
of Sports Science in Britain since the 1960 paying particular attention to events which 
led to the institutionalisation of Sports Science. Reference will also be paid the tentative 
acceptance of Sports Science by some and potential reasoning for this and the 
continuing resistance among some parts of the coaching community to the 
implementation of positivistic experimental science. 
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Poor sporting performance 
Following the poor performance of the British team at the Stockholm Games in 1912 
there was general outcry after what was considered a less than adequate display by 
British athletes. The comments made by F.A.M Webster at the time seemed to reflect the 
thoughts of a nation, he expressed ‘a feeling of shame that we should fall so low as to 
beaten by even lesser European nations, who for generations past have been our pupils 
in all sporting pastimes’.1 Some declared a concern over the impact that the failures in 
sporting pursuits could have on British prestige, with an article in The Times suggesting 
‘Whether we took that result very seriously ourselves or not, it was widely advertised in 
other countries as evidence of England’s decadence’.2 It was clear that the nations 
feeling of unequivocal failure following the British defeat on the most public of sporting 
stages was widely felt, with some even suggesting that the correct and obvious move 
would be to simply withdraw from the Olympic movement altogether.3 F.A.M Webster 
was one of the many individuals who expressed a feeling of concern over the poor British 
sporting performances, however British policy makers appeared to view this from a 
position of indifference and did little to try and resolve the problem. 
 
Despite the very public appeal urging for an improvement in British sport, sporting 
failure continued particularly during the periods of 1948-1953. During which time the 
English cricket team were beaten by Australia and the football team were defeated by 
America in their first venture to the World Cup in 1950 which was soon followed by the 
loss of its unbeaten home record to Hungary in 1953.4 It would seem that poor sporting 
performances were something that the British public had become accustomed to. 
                                            
1 Physical Education Department, University of Birmingham, Britain in the World of Sport: An 
Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport 
(Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 6. 
2 The Times, 18 August, 1913, 6. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport, 7. 
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However, national apprehension over poor sporting ability was made particularly 
apparent following the ‘ghastly failure of the British team at Helsinki’5 in 1952, which 
culminated in a gold medal total of just one. This failure was particularly difficult to 
accept considering the single gold was achieved by a horse rather than the British 
athletes, who, as Park suggested, for generations passed had been the ones ‘who had 
taught the world to play’.6 Once again the critics surfaced, but this time it was the ill-
equipped British training methods and the amateur tradition that was to be questioned. 
The Times suggested that ‘the root of the problem of British participation in international 
sport. Far too frequently British athletes are reared in the laboratory atmosphere of stop 
watches, statistics and records. Many critics have publicly drawn attention to the danger 
of this approach undermining the will to win. Unfortunately, those critics have been 
exonerated’.7 The overwhelming sense of failure had returned and John Disley who was 
acting chief instructor at the Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR) centre even 
questioned whether ‘if years of preaching that,...‘be a good loser’, and ‘the important 
thing is the taking part and not [the] winning’, has built up a psychological barrier to 
winning in the British youth’.8 A culmination of factors such as the prominent defeats of 
British sporting teams leading up to 1952 coupled with the poor result at the Helsinki 
Games appeared to provide an impetus to improve the success of British sport on the 
international stage because in 1956 a group of physical educationalists at the University 
of Birmingham published a pamphlet entitled Britain in the World of Sport. This report 
concluded that if Britain was to improve in terms of success in sport then the ‘traditional’ 
amateur rules needed to be relaxed somewhat and some form of intervention was 
required. They suggested that ‘rising standards are paid for by training which is both 
more intensive and extensive. The single-minded attitude to sport, which makes such 
training possible, is not easily allied to the detachment necessary to regard the result as 
unimportant’.9 Although this was considered unorthodox by the traditionalists in British 
sport; the seed for intervention in British sport had been planted, whether that be of a 
financial or scientific nature. It could be argued that although many considered the 
suggestion as heresy, support for the idea of intervention began to grow. It is clear to 
see why many have considered Britain in the World of Sport as the primary catalyst for 
The Wolfenden Report, which since its publication in 1960 has long be considered the 
‘blue-print’ for sports development in Britain.10 
 
The Wolfenden Report of 1960 headed the calls of many who had demanded a new 
approach to sport in Britain, perhaps the direct result of the success and developments 
of sport in other countries and a growing concern that sport now had a much larger role 
to play within society. The Wolfenden Report developed into a commodity of great 
significance, not only did it raise the profile of sport in Britain it also indirectly led to 
developments such as the introduction of scientific measures to sport. Despite this 
somewhat impressive haul of achievements as Coghlan noted, when the Wolfenden 
committee was initially established it ‘aroused no particular concern other than general 
broad interest and yet the results flowing from the fifty-seven recommendations were 
alter the face of British Sport within a decade’.11 The report suggested that ‘all sports 
which include competition at international level are being subjected to the pressures or 
rising standards and the need for more extensive and intensive training’.12 The 
committee went on further to suggest that ‘with very limited resources available to them 
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several medical and scientific groups have carried out constructive and instructive 
work...we see a real opportunity here...to encourage and stimulate an increased and 
wide-spread interest in the medical and scientific matters related to sport.13 Recognition 
was finally given to the fact that more sophisticated training developed from scientific 
research was needed if success was to be achieved on the international stage. Yet 
despite this glimpse of promise it is apparent that the traditionalists still retained a major 
influence in British sport when they argued ‘it is not the end of the world if British teams 
are defeated, still less is it a symptom or proof of national decadence’14 and that ‘it is 
better to lose gracefully and good-humouredly than to win by sharp practice or 
unsportsmanlike conduct.’15 It was clear that until some relaxation of the traditional 
amateur rules was set in motion there was no prospect of any form of scientific 
intervention being applied to British sport. However, The Wolfenden Report of 1960 
potentially provided the means for such a change to occur.  
 
Altitude research and the British 
The 1960s in Britain was the era in which research and documentation into sport began 
to grow, something which was previously absent in British sport. Prior to 1965 
particularly, apart from a limited amount of insufficient facts, there was very little 
information available in the fields of sports science. Coghlan has suggested that ‘if a case 
was to be made for greater public investment in sport, ran the argument, more 
information must be available to sustain that case’.16 Whether this is true, or if the 
successes of nations such as the Soviet Union and America, with their very sophisticated 
and advanced sports science systems, had finally caught the attention of the nation is 
unclear. It could have been a culmination of factors that led the BOA to express a desire 
for control over sports science research in Britain which ultimately led to the launch of 
their Mexican research project into altitude in 1965. This represented a pivotal moment 
in the history of British sport as this was the first time that a British sporting 
organisation had undertaken such a costly research project (£5,000 had been allocated, 
which consisted of £2,500 from the Government via the Sports Council and £2,500 from 
the BOA itself).17 As Heggie has noted, the relative novelty of the BOA engaging in such 
a research project may be lost on modern audiences but this was the birth of a modern, 
medicalised, ‘expert’ BOA.18 The object of the research project was ‘to find out how 
British Competitors are likely to react to the conditions in Mexico City at the Olympic 
Games in 1968, and to support findings with such physiological tests as seem 
necessary’.19 The research project was initiated in Britain on the 4th October 196520 and 
was conducted by Dr L.G.C Pugh, Dr J.R Owen and John le Masurier21. Shortly after this 
the team (along with their 6 athletes) travelled to Mexico on the 6th November 1956.22 
The results of the research project demonstrated that the with regard to acclimatisation 
the BOA had recommended that ‘all endurance competitors in the 1968 British Olympic 
Team should arrive in Mexico City approximately 4 weeks before the opening 
ceremony...competitors in explosive events should arrive in Mexico City a minimum of 3 
weeks beforehand’.23 Such a conclusion placed the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) in a dilemma because to be considered an amateur in 1960 under the rules of 
Olympic competition an athlete was not permitted to spend more than 4 weeks in one 
                                            
13 Ibid., 83. 
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15 Ibid., 59. 
16 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 45. 
17 British Olympic Association committee minutes, 14 July, 1965. 
18 Vanessa Heggie, ‘Only the British appear to be making a fuss: The science of success and the 
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year at a designated training camp.24 President and Vice-president of the IOC, Avery 
Brundage and David Burghley, respectively, had strongly held beliefs about the 
principles of amateurism both of which reflected the principles of amateurism that 
Coubertin had created. Therefore, a decision needed to be made regarding not only the 
length of time required to adjust to the elevated altitude level but also the length of time 
permitted under the amateur ruling. Discussions between Brundage and Burghley began 
and despite the large amount of research carried out on the issue of altitude it would 
seem that the British study was considered one of the most significant as this was the 
most frequently mentioned in the negotiations. Finally the IOC decided that ‘to achieve 
fairness as far as possible between competitors, no athletes, other than those who 
usually live or train at such heights shall specifically do so at high altitude for more than 
4 weeks in the last 4 months before the opening of the Games’.25  
 
The altitude debate seemingly acted as a key moment in the history of amateur sport; it 
had been established that athletes who by pure chance had been born, grown up and 
trained at high-altitude were predisposed to success in endurance events. As a result it 
has gradually become accepted that those athletes who had been born at sea-level could 
replicate such success by training or living at altitude. As Wryyn has suggested, perhaps 
one of the factors that spelled the end of amateurism more than any other was an 
understanding that living and training at altitude could potentially improve performance 
in certain events. Consequently, athletes needed the freedom to live and train where it 
would be best to improve their own performance.26 From a British perspective, the fact 
that the study commissioned by the BOA was considered so highly was a boost for 
British sport and science. Britain had undertaken its first body of research into the 
scientific aspects of sport, which had been partly state funded and subjected to criticism 
and the fact that it was considered an overwhelming success seemingly provided the 
confidence researchers required to continue. It could even be suggested that this was 
the initial event which caused the institutionalisation of sports science in Britain since it 
appeared to ‘open the floodgates’ for the acceptance and use of sports science. This was 
further enhanced by the work undertaken in response to the increasing use of ergogenic 
aids and drug abuse which became a major issue during the 1960s. With regards to the 
use of anabolic steroids the BOA believed that ‘in the doses alleged to be used by some 
athletes to give an improved performance, there is a grave risk of danger to health, such 
as sterility in the male...other affects may not be apparent immediately’.27 This 
uncertainty regarding the effects of such a substance on health and the moral issue 
concerning its use led to the Sports Council offering a grant to the British researcher, 
Professor Brooks in 1973. Three years later Brooks was credited with the development of 
the initial method to detect the use of anabolic steroids in the urine28, yet another boost 
for British sports science. Also the scientific work that was being carried out in 
universities and higher education institutions during the 1960s that was beginning to 
focus on the experimental psychology and physiology into sport heralded the start of a 
research programme that would develop into sports science in the academic capacity 
which is commonplace today.  
 
Early sports science and amateurism 
The BOA Mexico research project could be described as the birth of sports science in 
Britain due to its influence on the dramatic increase in the development of sports science 
which can be seen post 1960s. However, the capacity in which we recognise sports 
science today can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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Conversely, it is clear that the aims of these early forms of research which were carried 
out on the human body were not to increase athletic potential, as Hoberman has 
indicated: 
  
the scientists who turned their attention to athletic physiology during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did so not to produce athletic wonders but 
to measure and otherwise explore the biological wonders presented by the high 
performance athlete of this era. It was a time, one scientist of the age wrote, when 
phenomena once considered mere curiosities or freaks of nature called out for 
scientific investigation.29  
 
There are many examples to demonstrate this, for example, research by Zoth in 1899 
was focused on the pedalling action of cyclists and concluded that muscle physiology 
played a specific role in the execution of such an activity. However there was no mention 
of the possibility of applying the research findings to the improvement of performance.30 
Possibly because of the scientific marginality of sport during this time or for the simple 
fact that the scientific discoveries which these researchers were unearthing were in 
themselves interesting enough that there was no desire to apply this to anything else. It 
also needs to be considered that during this period the principles of training, which 
would have been enforced by the trainer or coach were focused around the repetition of 
skills in order the improve technique and co-ordination. As Ritchie and Beamish have 
noted, it was believed that the attributes such as power, speed and agility were 
unchangeable and that improvement was only achieved through greater co-ordination 
and precision.31 The emergence of the likes of the Soviet Union, in which sport was used 
to demonstrate the superiority of the communist way of life, caused a shift in the role 
that sports science had to play, particularly in the post-1945 period. The Soviet Union 
began to devote resources in order to achieve success and prestige through victory in 
sporting competitions on the world stage, which was achieved via sophisticated and 
comprehensive sports science systems. Despite the ethical issues which were set to 
emerge in the coming years, it was clear at the time that such practices had paid 
dividend. It is apparent, however, that there was a significant lag of approximately 
twenty years between the emergence and acceptance of sports science and the uptake 
in British sport possibly as a result of the adherence to the strict amateur ethos which 
continued to reign in Britain. There was a feeling that, British sport which was 
underpinned by an unwritten moral code and controlled by a clear amateur ethic, did not 
require science, because ultimately the result was of secondary importance. As Heggie 
has stated, to train too hard, to dope, even to take a specific diet and to be overly 
concerned with winning were just ‘not cricket’.32 The most important rule of all was to 
win with dignity and lose well and as Holt has suggested, losing was acceptable as long 
as you ‘did your best’.33 The sentiments of the British football administrator, Sir Stanley 
Rous in 1953 appear to sum up perfectly the British attitude towards sport and science 
at this time, ‘the British, compared with many other nations, usually go about their 
games in a surprisingly unserious way...who cares what effect [exercise] has on 
chemical structure of a muscle.’34  
 
Resistance to sports science and the coach-sports scientists’ relationship 
As previously discussed, since the 1960s however, work into sports science has 
gradually increased and become accepted within society, albeit tentatively by some. 
                                            
29 John Hoberman, Mortal Engines (New York: Free Press), 10. 
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33 Richard Holt, Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 97. 
34 Stanley Rous, ‘Foreword’ of Fitness and Injury in Sport. Care, Diagnosis and Treatment by 
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Despite the many advances which occurred following the BOA Mexico research project 
there were still those who appeared reluctant to accept these new developments. For 
example, a Commander Mackay wrote to Dr Raymond Owen of the BOA stating that 
‘subject of artificial acclimatisation to altitude. This matter had been subject of debate 
since the abstracts of some papers, presented at the Russian conference of experts in 
altitude physiology and sport in 1965, did suggest the possibility of using altitude 
chambers to assist acclimatisation.’35 The acclimatisation chambers were offered to the 
BOA for them to use as they saw fit, however, the BOA refused to take up the offer. 
Further correspondence between Owen and Kennith Sandilands ‘Sandy’ Duncan again of 
the BOA appeared to provide some insight into why the chambers were not used, it was 
stated that ‘although it may be possible that the Loughborough one may show 
something, it would seem that we were quite right when we said there was as yet 
nothing definite to prove that these chambers would help us- in other words we do not 
seem to have missed out on anything.’36 The assumption would be that after all the 
evidence available demonstrating the benefits of training at altitude or in this case 
‘artificial’ altitude, that the BOA would have been very keen to take up the offer. But it is 
clear that perhaps the traditional amateur ethos which reigned over British sport for so 
long had once again prevented the use of positivistic experimental science. Another 
example to demonstrate British reluctance to integrate sports science with training is 
concerned with the ‘French Government [offering] British athletes the use of their 
Olympic training centre at Font Romeu in Pyrenes’.37 An article in The Observer 
proclaimed  
 
Walter Winterbottom wrote to all governing bodies telling them that the French had 
invited us to use the centre in Font Romeu and pointing out the evidence that the 
more acclimatisation an athlete could get the better it would be. The response from 
the 20 or so sports which face the biggest Olympic problem in their history was 
“some interest”.38 
 
It was further suggested that Britain could do well in international sport because ‘we 
have the technology, the know-how and yet we are not using it’39, similarities can be 
drawn between this and an article in the The Times in 1927 which it stated ‘British 
performance was a crime against nature. You have the finest raw material in the 
world...and you persistently neglect to develop it’.40 British sport had moved on some 
forty years but had seemingly failed to develop with regards to sports science and 
although there was acceptance by some, the overall feeling was that of reluctance. This 
internalised resistance between sport and science reached far into 1980, however since 
then sports science has gradually become institutionalised. Particularly in the last twenty 
years it has become a centralised part of coaching and athlete preparation.  
 
The slow development of professionalisation in British sport does raise the question 
about whether a symbiotic relationship has been established between the professions of 
coaching and sports science or if this has developed into a mutually antagonistic affair. 
There is evidence to suggest that tensions do in fact exist in the relationship. The 
purpose of sports science is to enhance athletic performance through the development of 
scientific knowledge and the purpose of coaching is to improve performance through 
interventions in preparation and training. However, Brackenridge argues that the shared 
goal of the two individuals, which is that of performance enhancement, is perhaps not 
compatible with their other goals. An example of this relates to the sports scientists, the 
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majority whom work within academic institutions where the pressures exerted on them 
via initiatives such as the Research Assessment Exercise are so great that perhaps they 
have a tendency to place papers above people.41 It also had to be considered that prior 
to 1970 particularly, before sports science was recognised as a legitimate academic 
discipline, virtually all of the ideas about training and exercise that coaches had gained 
had developed from observation and intuition. Therefore, it could be suggested that the 
majority of coaches already posses a strategy that is effective and would be reluctant to 
alter this based on the grounds of scientific research. Coaches have historically 
implemented techniques and methods well in advance of the science proving or 
disproving that they are effective. Renowned athletics coach, Arthur Lydiard is once 
noted to have said ‘Coaches already know what works, and the scientist's job is to tell 
them why it works!42 In a similar vein, athletics coach Steve Jones explained ‘I make it 
simple...there’s no science in it, no heart-rate monitors, nothing . . . it’s just about 
running instinctively . . . none of it comes out of a book. It all comes out of my own 
experience.’43 However, it is not strictly true to assume that the coach is always correct 
and it is feasible to suggest that some often neglect to use methods that would improve 
performance or are unaware of the techniques available to them. Such an issue is 
highlighted by Reade, Rodgers and Hall who indicated that although the majority of 
coaches are likely to consult other coaches to get new information there are also those 
who are willing to incorporate sports science into their training but do not have the 
means to access such information.44  
 
It is clear that a small proportion of coaches’ remain suspicious about the incorporation 
of sports science into an athlete’s training regime, which could potentially be a 
throwback to the traditional amateur ethos, and that time constraints and commitments 
on the sports scientists themselves can often hinder the success of such integration. 
However, key individuals appear unaware or refuse to acknowledge the tensions that 
exist. Neil Spurway, chair of The British Association of Sport and Exercise Sciences 
(BASES) from 2000-2002 claimed that ‘sport science has added to the recent 
achievements of UK sport -particularly at the Sydney Olympics.’45 Conversely, one World 
Class Advisor of the UK sport institute is noted to have commented that ‘the trouble with 
sport science is that…unsophisticated demand plus research-focused supply equals no 
effective application.’46 In conclusion, it is clear that little evidence is available to 
demonstrate that coaching and sports science have yet reached a mutually beneficial 
and productive relationship. As Brackenridge suggests, if this is to develop into a more 
dynamic rapport, scientists seeking sound ecological validity need to ground their 
research in genuine practical problems and coaches seeking sound science should select 
scientists who can speak to them in the language of sporting practice.47 
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